ABSTRACT: Many developing economies use tax holidays to attract foreign investment by providing a limited period of tax exemptions and reductions for qualified investors. This paper investigates the effect of tax holidays on foreign investors' tax noncompliance behavior in China's developing economy. We measure noncompliance in terms of tax audit adjustments the Chinese tax authorities require in response to avoidance and evasion. The results indicate that a company's tax-holiday position affects noncompliance. Companies are least compliant before entering a tax holiday, and most compliant while in a tax-exemption period. In addition, domestic market-oriented companies, service-oriented companies, and joint ventures are less compliant than export-oriented companies, manufacturing-oriented companies, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, respectively.
INTRODUCTION
T his paper investigates whether a corporate taxpayer's tax-holiday position affects its tax noncompliance behavior. This question is important because many developing countries use tax holidays to attract foreign investment, which is a significant part of their economies.
1 Evidence on noncompliance can help policymakers assess the impact of tax policies on noncompliance, and can help tax authorities plan more effective and efficient tax audits. We measure noncompliance in terms of tax audit adjustments that the Chinese tax authorities require in response to avoidance and evasion. 2 Because legal requirements protect the confidentiality of corporate tax returns, empirical research on corporate tax noncompliance is limited.
3 A few studies have examined the association between corporate characteristics and tax noncompliance of U. S. corporations. Rice (1992) found that disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies encourage better tax compliance, while marginal tax rates and firm size are positively associated with the absolute level of noncompliance. Based on a questionnaire survey in the U.S., Bradley (1994) suggested that risk of audit adjustment increases compliance, but financial stress decreases compliance. Murray (1995) found that older firms and out-of-state firms are less compliant with U.S. sales tax regulations. Mills (1996 Mills ( , 1998 provided empirical evidence that proposed tax audit adjustments increase as the difference between book and taxable income widens.
We are unaware of any empirical evidence on corporate tax noncompliance in developing economies. U.S.-based studies suggest that tax rates, industry, firm size, firm age, risk of audit adjustment, and financial stress may affect noncompliance. However, other factors such as public disclosure requirements and book-tax differences are irrelevant in our context. In China, most Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises are private companies that use tax-based accounting systems. Thus, we examine other corporate characteristics that are likely relevant to foreign investors' noncompliance, including activity orientation (export vs. domestic market-oriented firms), technology status (high-technology vs. other firms), form of investment (joint ventures vs. wholly foreignowned enterprises), and inside-ownership concentration (Hong Kong-and Taiwan-sourced vs. other firms).
Tax holidays provide a unique setting in which to test the effect of tax-rate incentives on noncompliance. In the U.S., tax-rate differences are typically due to variations in the firms' taxable income levels. However, a firm's taxable income level depends on its avoidance behavior, which tax authorities may not fully detect. Therefore, tax-rate differences in 1 China (Leung 1998) , Russia (Hammond and Kozyrenko 1997) , India (Sinha 1996) , Brazil (Stewart 1998) , and Malaysia (Deloitte Touche Tomatsu 1999) all provide tax holidays to attract foreign investment. Many developed countries also provide tax incentives in municipal ''Enterprise Zones'' (Joy 1993; McFadden-Wade 1996) . However, developed countries' advanced infrastructure and political and economic stability often suffice to lure foreign investment without tax incentives. Foreign investment plays a significant role in developing countries' economies. In China, the gross industrial output of foreign investment enterprises (Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises) amounted to 21 percent of the national industrial output in 1997 (SSB 1998, 456) . These firms' imports and exports accounted for over 45 percent of national foreign trade in 1997 (SSB 1998) . The government would lose significant tax revenue if these enterprises engage in massive tax evasion and avoidance. 2 Chinese tax authorities consider all noncompliance as avoidance or evasion. All noncompliance is subject to penalty, and authorities do not normally differentiate between avoidance and evasion. While tax evaders can be prosecuted and jailed, the government typically levies monetary penalties. 3 Compliance research has focused on the behavior of individuals. Corporate tax noncompliance requires multiple parties to behave strategically, so it is more complicated than individual tax evasion. Therefore, evidence on individual tax noncompliance behavior cannot be directly generalized to explain corporate tax noncompliance.
prior U.S. studies are endogenous to avoidance behavior (Mills 1998; Rice 1992; MacKieMason 1992) . By contrast, the tax-holiday setting establishes different flat tax rates for each holiday position. Tax-rate differences arise because firms are in different tax-holiday positions. These tax-rate differences are exogenous to avoidance behavior once a firm has entered a tax-holiday status. Thus, tax holidays provide a good context for investigating how tax-rate differences affect corporate noncompliance. We collected and analyzed 583 tax audit cases on corporate tax noncompliance by foreign investors in China. Chinese tax authorities provided this unique data set for academic research. We find that the corporate taxpayer's tax-holiday position significantly affects noncompliance. Companies in the pre-holiday position are least compliant. By contrast, companies are most compliant in the tax-exemption period that has a zero tax rate and a relatively heavy penalty for evasion. Domestic market-oriented companies have a larger detected noncompliance than their export-oriented counterparts. Joint ventures and service-oriented companies also appear to be less compliant, on average, than wholly foreign-owned and manufacturing-oriented companies.
The results of this research are relevant to public policymakers, tax authorities, field auditors, and researchers interested in international accounting. First, the results should be of interest for public policymakers designing foreign investment policies and tax incentives in developing countries. Second, they can help tax authorities and field auditors plan more effective and efficient audits. For example, given the high level of noncompliance in the pre-holiday period, policymakers may consider limiting the pre-holiday period, and tax authorities may intensify audit scrutiny for firms in this period. Third, since firms in different tax-holiday positions have different tax rates, the results provide researchers an interesting perspective in studying the effect of tax-rate incentives on corporate tax noncompliance. Finally, although the findings pertain to China-the largest developing countryempirical evidence on how tax-holiday position and other corporate characteristics affect compliance should provide a useful reference for other developing countries.
The next section explains the institutional background of tax audits in China. Section III formulates the research hypothesis. Section IV outlines the research methodology, Section V presents the empirical test results, and Section VI concludes.
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF TAX AUDITS IN CHINA Tax Incentives in China
To attract foreign capital, advanced technology, and modern management techniques, China grants foreign investment enterprises (FIEs), which include Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, various tax incentives to invest in designated locations and preferred industries. For example, enterprises established in Special Economic Zones, the Pudong New Development Zone in Shanghai, and Economic and Technological Development Zones, enjoy a flat tax rate of 15 percent (the normal flat tax rate is 30 percent) (NPC 1991, Article 7). Manufacturing-oriented enterprises scheduled to operate for ten years or more are entitled to a tax holiday, which exempts them from income tax in the first two profit-making years, followed by a 50 percent reduction over the next three years (NPC 1991, Article 8) . Enterprises with advanced production technology or an export orientation also receive a 50 percent tax reduction for additional years after the initial fiveyear tax holiday expires (State Council 1991, Article 75) .
Tax Audits in China
FIEs in China engage in significant tax evasion and avoidance. Chinese tax authorities discovered a total tax evasion of RMB 4,200 million (approximately U.S. $506 million) in over 20 provinces and cities, through the audit of 47,000 FIEs, representing 25 percent of the operating FIEs in 1991 -1995 (Dong 1998 . Because such evasion leads to significant revenue loss, the Chinese government issued proclamations designed to boost the revenue collected from foreign enterprises. Detailed Procedures Regarding Tax Audits of Foreign Taxpayers (SAT 1993a) requires Chinese tax authorities to conduct an annual tax audit on all FIEs, subject to practical resource constraints. Our study focuses on this regular annual tax audit, which covers all income-tax noncompliance. 4 Tax auditors examine details of items reported on tax returns. When special complexities arise, such as transfer-pricing manipulations and politically sensitive matters, tax authorities conduct special audits. Special investigations are relatively rare, 5 but when they occur, they replace the FIE's regular annual audit.
In principle, all FIEs are subject to annual tax audits. However, because of insufficient manpower, the government's goal is to audit at least 30 percent of FIEs each year. Most large tax bureaus have developed computer programs to classify enterprises into three audit classes (Huang 1996) . Class A designates ''good'' enterprises that tax authorities will audit every two years. Most enterprises are classified in Class B. These enterprises are subject to annual audit if sufficient resources are available. Tax authorities will not audit Class C enterprises, as their books are considered unreliable. Class C enterprises must pay tax at an assessed amount regardless of their reported profits.
The regulation (SAT 1993a) outlines the content and scope of an investigation, audit procedures, and documentation of misstatements made by audited FIEs. The Appendix summarizes the general procedures followed in each annual tax audit.
Tax authorities make audit adjustments to taxable income to correct any misstatements detected in tax audits. Misstatements include errors or irregularities resulting from noncompliance with tax rules and regulations. For example, management fees and royalties paid to associated enterprises are not deductible, while entertainment expenses, bad debts, and depreciation are subject to various deduction limits. Audit adjustments also correct misstatements from underreporting sales revenue, overstating cost of sales, deducting expenses without proper supporting invoices, and other violations of Chinese regulations.
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we develop a hypothesis about the impact of the tax-holiday position on tax noncompliance by FIEs. We measure tax noncompliance as the magnitude of the tax audit adjustment required by Chinese tax authorities, relative to sales revenue. We also identify and control for other corporate characteristics that may affect FIE's tax noncompliance.
Tax-Holiday Position
China grants a tax holiday to certain FIEs in their early years of operation. FIEs planning to engage in manufacturing operations for at least ten years qualify for a ''two-year exemption and three-year concession'' tax holiday. The concession is a 50 percent reduction 4 The regular annual tax audit regulation (SAT 1993a) applies only to foreign investment enterprises. Domestic
Chinese enterprises are not subject to the same audit because most are directly or indirectly owned by the state. Profits of state-owned enterprises belong to the government, and enterprise management includes representatives from the ruling party to help oversee operations, so tax authorities do not see a great need to audit state-owned enterprises. In addition, China governs domestic enterprises under different income tax laws, and does not grant them tax holidays. Therefore, tax audits of domestic and foreign enterprises are not comparable. 5 Tax authorities conducted 200 special investigations on transfer pricing in coastal China during 1992-93 (Chan and Chow 1997, 1998) . In 1996, there were only 300 special audits on transfer pricing and nine other special investigations on tax evasion (Xiang 1997) . By contrast, authorities conducted about 19,000 regular annual tax audits in 1994, the first year of the required annual audit (Xiang 1996) .
of the applicable tax rate. FIEs engaged in service industries generally do not qualify for the tax holiday. However, in special circumstances, service-oriented FIEs such as those located in special zones with an invested capital not less than U.S. $5 million and a planned operation period of ten years or more, may enjoy a ''one-year exemption and two-year concession'' tax holiday. The tax holiday begins with the ''first profit-making year.'' This is the first year after the start of operations in which the firm makes a profit after offsetting losses accumulated since the business started. The first profit-making year is the first tax-exempt year.
FIEs normally make little or no profit in their first few years of operation. However, if they do make a small profit, this triggers the start of the tax holiday, and only this ''small profit'' is exempt from tax. Thus, FIEs have incentives to exaggerate losses during the preholiday period to delay the start of tax holiday. Delaying the first profit-making year not only reduces the total tax payable in nominal terms, but also increases savings by deferring cash outflow.
FIEs in the tax-exemption period have no immediate incentive to underreport taxable income, as they are exempt from tax (although they can carry a loss incurred in the second tax-exemption year forward to the tax-reduction period). Tax authorities penalize any detected noncompliance at the normal tax rate (15 percent for FIEs in special zones) plus a penalty factor (up to 500 percent, but usually 10 to 20 percent of the tax owed), regardless of the FIE's tax position (SAT 1996) . Therefore, evasion is generally not worthwhile during the exemption period. During the tax-reduction period, FIEs have more motivation to misstate taxable income, though the tax rate is comparatively low. When the tax-holiday period expires, FIEs pay taxes at the normal rate, so they have more incentives to understate taxable income. Thus, we expect larger tax adjustments after the tax-holiday period expires.
We classify FIEs into four tax-holiday positions: before tax-holiday, during taxexemption, during tax-reduction, and after tax-holiday. The following hypothesis summarizes our expectation for the magnitudes of tax audit adjustments for FIEs in these four different tax-holiday positions.
Hypothesis:
The magnitudes of tax audit adjustments vary for FIEs in different taxholiday positions. Specifically, audit adjustments in the pre-and postholiday periods are greater than those in the tax-reduction period, which, in turn, are greater than those in the tax-exemption period.
Control Variables
We next consider corporate characteristics that may affect FIE's tax noncompliance: activity orientation (export-oriented vs. domestic market-oriented), technology status (hightechnology vs. others), industry affiliation (manufacturing-oriented vs. service-oriented), form of investment (joint ventures vs. wholly foreign-owned enterprises), and insideownership concentration (Hong Kong-and Taiwan-sourced vs. others).
Activity Orientation (Export-Oriented vs. Domestic Market-Oriented FIEs)
To encourage exports, China grants a 50 percent tax reduction after the normal fiveyear tax holiday expires to export-oriented FIEs that export at least 70 percent of their products in any year (in terms of sales revenue, as verified by the Bureau of Economic Development) (State Council 1991, Article 75(1)). 6 The tax-favored treatment reduces export-oriented FIEs' incentives to underreport taxable income. Further, it is more difficult to audit export-oriented FIEs because their activities tend to be more diversified and the bookkeeping practices for inter-jurisdictional transactions including foreign currency transactions are more complicated. Thus, we expect smaller tax adjustments for export-oriented FIEs.
Technology Status (High-Technology vs. Other FIEs)
Like other developing countries, China encourages investment involving new/high technology. China grants a 50 percent tax reduction for an extended three-year period after the initial tax concessions for FIEs that the tax authorities accept as ''technologically advanced enterprises'' (State Council 1991, Article 75(8) ). ''Technologically advanced enterprises'' use advanced techniques, technology, and equipment, and their products are either in short supply or newly developed in China. The additional tax relief reduces high-technology FIEs' incentives to misstate taxable income.
In addition, since attracting advanced technology is a priority for the Chinese government, tax authorities are reluctant to intensively audit high-technology companies in order to reduce the risk of losing these firms to other jurisdictions (Chan and Chow 1997) . Thus, we expect smaller tax adjustments for high-technology companies.
Industry Affiliation (Manufacturing-Oriented vs. Service-Oriented FIEs)
Most manufacturing-oriented FIEs qualify for the five-year tax holiday, i.e., a two-year exemption and three-year reduction. In contrast, only a few service-oriented FIEs qualify for a one-year exemption and two-year reduction holiday. Manufacturing-oriented FIEs thus have less incentive to underreport taxable income. It is also more difficult for Chinese tax authorities to detect misstatements in production costs. The regulation (SAT 1993a) requires tax officials to verify production costs based only on an enterprise's documents and ledgers-they seldom use analytical procedures to test reasonableness. For these reasons, we expect smaller tax adjustments for manufacturing-oriented enterprises than for serviceoriented FIEs.
Form of Investment (Joint Ventures vs. Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises)
Although foreign investment has played an important role in China's evolution toward a market economy, the government is concerned about foreign exploitation. For most joint ventures, the Chinese partners are state-owned enterprises in which the government expects to play a monitoring role by appointing Chinese managers (Chan and Chow 1997) . This is one of the major reasons that China prefers joint ventures over wholly foreign-owned enterprises. However, the basic salary of Chinese managers in joint ventures is relatively low, as it is linked to the pay scale of their state-owned enterprises. In recent years, the reward system has changed to link managers' pay through a bonus scheme to the joint venture's performance (Lee and McNally 1997) . Given Chinese managers' low salaries, the bonus is an important part of their income. FIEs' bonus schemes often reward improving cash flow and reducing costs (EIU 1999) . Tax avoidance provides one way to achieve these objectives, as tax is both a cash outflow and an extra cost. Chinese managers may therefore have incentives to collaborate with foreign managers to manipulate financial reports. That is, some Chinese managers are not playing the monitoring role the government expects them to play.
Nevertheless, Chinese managers in joint ventures often have close connections with government officials, including tax officials. The presence of a Chinese manager appointed by an influential person from a large state-owned enterprise facilitates a joint-venture's communication with tax authorities. Studies in the U.S. indicate that contact with tax authorities increases compliance among individuals (Witte and Woodbury 1985) . However, there is no empirical evidence on whether such contact increases corporate taxpayers' compliance.
In summary, the net effect of Chinese managers' monitoring and contact with tax authorities on joint-ventures' compliance is ambiguous. Thus, we have no directional expectation for this control variable.
Inside-Ownership Concentration (Hong Kong-and Taiwan-Sourced vs. Other FIEs)
Previous research has examined the relation between inside-ownership concentration and earnings manipulation. Klassen (1997) suggests that closely held companies can efficiently inform shareholders of firm value through channels other than audited financial statements. To the extent that it is less costly to reduce both reported earnings and taxes, managers of closely held companies are likely to be more aggressive tax planners. In addition, many closely held companies are managed by owners who often hold a large percentage interest in the company. This environment creates more incentives for tax evasion.
FIEs from Hong Kong and Taiwan are often closely held, owner-managed family businesses (Liu 1999) , while non-Chinese enterprises from the U.S. and Japan are mainly subsidiaries of widely held, employee-managed multinational corporations. Since information about the inside ownership structure of FIEs is not available, we use the source of the FIE as a proxy. Thus, Hong Kong-and Taiwan-sourced FIEs are proxies for firms with higher inside-ownership concentration, and we expect these FIEs to be less compliant than non-Chinese FIEs.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN Data Collection
We collected tax audit data from the tax bureaus of selected Chinese coastal areas that enjoy large foreign investment. Income tax revenues from FIEs in the areas contribute over 50 percent of the total collected from all FIEs in China in 1996. The selected FIEs are subject to the same reduced tax rate of 15 percent. These areas offer the same tax holidays in terms of tax exemption and a 50 percent reduction of applicable tax rates for manufacturing-oriented, technologically advanced, and export-oriented enterprises.
The tax bureaus agreed to provide cases of FIEs audited in 1997 for calendar year 1996 tax returns. We requested cases from the Class B category only, because this class represents the majority of FIEs. This selection also provides a control as all sample firms belong to the same audit-risk class. During the data collection from the audit files, a researcher was present to observe and answer any questions the officials had. The tax bureaus selected cases at random and there was no indication that they intentionally included or excluded particular cases in the sample. Therefore, the sample companies should be reasonably representative of FIEs in China with similar corporate characteristics.
We collected a total of 585 audit cases. Of those, 147 had zero adjustment (no change in taxable income). The other 438 had positive adjustments (an increase in taxable income). We excluded two cases with zero sales, which left a final sample of 583 cases.
The general guidelines for tax audits in China (SAT 1993a) require tax auditors to record in a tax audit report details of any misstatements found in each audit and the related adjustments. After review and approval, the tax bureau sends an official written notice to the audited FIE, specifying the nature and the amount of the adjustments.
Tax officials collected the following data directly from the tax audit reports:
(1) Details of individual adjustments, including the types of the expense or revenue adjusted, the amount of each adjustment, the effect of the adjustment (increase or decrease) on taxable income, and the accounts affected.
(2) Reasons for the adjustments. These include expenses exceeding the legal limit, nonallowable expenses, unreported and underreported revenue, and overstatement of the cost of sales. Tax officials obtained the FIEs' demographic information by matching the FIE's file number in the tax audit report with the general background file in the tax bureau.
Hypothesis Tests
We first conduct a univariate analysis to compare mean tax audit adjustments across the four tax-holiday positions. We then use multiple regression analysis to test the hypothesized relations. We measure tax noncompliance using tax audit adjustments deflated by sales revenue. We deflate by sales revenue because most of the tax adjustments concern expenses that are related to the level of the firm's activity. We subject the dependent variable to a log transform to control for heteroskedasticity. For firms with zero adjustment, we changed that figure to one Renminbi (RMB, the Chinese currency) to avoid taking the log of zero.
To analyze the effect of tax holidays on noncompliance, we classified FIEs into four groups based on their tax-holiday positions as filed in their tax returns: (1) FIEs before their first profit-making year, (2) those in the tax-exemption period, (3) those in the taxreduction period, and (4) those after the tax holiday.
7 FIEs ineligible for tax holidays are classified into the same group as FIEs that are beyond their tax holidays. Both types of FIEs are subject to the same tax rate, so they should have similar incentives for tax noncompliance. To test the hypothesis, we estimate the following regression:
where:
7 After their initial five-year tax holiday, ''export-oriented'' FIEs must pay tax at the normal rate when they file their tax returns. However, if they have exported 70 percent in the tax year, they can receive a 50 percent tax refund. The tax refund is not certain. During the tax year, the FIEs cannot be sure whether they will meet the target. After year-end, the Bureau of Economic Development verifies their total sales and export sales. This process is usually lengthy (six to nine months after year-end) and FIEs must submit proper documentation for verification. Many refund requests have been rejected due to inadequate documentation and year-end-cutoff problems. Thus, we classify such ''export-oriented'' FIEs in the post-holiday position. In contrast, the Bureau of Economic Development normally approves FIE's high-technology status at the time of their incorporation. For three years after the initial five-year tax holiday, high-technology FIEs enjoy a 50 percent tax reduction when they file their returns. We classify such high-technology FIEs under the taxreduction period. Control Variables: EXPORT ϭ 1 if an FIE is an export-oriented enterprise that qualifies for export tax preference, 0 otherwise; TECHNOLOGY ϭ 1 if an FIE is a high-technology enterprise that has been accepted as a ''technologically advanced enterprise,'' 0 otherwise; MANUFACTURING ϭ 1 if an FIE is a manufacturing-oriented enterprise per the industry code used in the tax audit report, 0 otherwise; JOINT-VENTURE ϭ 1 if an FIE is a joint venture, 0 otherwise; and HONGKONG-TAIWAN ϭ 1 if an FIE is sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan (a proxy for high-inside-ownership concentration), 0 otherwise.
The three tax-related dummy variables, PRE-HOLIDAY, TAX-REDUCTION, and POST-HOLIDAY, capture the incremental effects of these tax-holiday positions relative to the tax-exemption position that is reflected in the intercept. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the study's independent and dependent variables. Panel A shows that about half (47 percent) of the sample FIEs are enjoying tax holidays (exemption and reduction), while the other half (53 percent) of the sample firms are outside the tax-holiday periods (pre-and post-holiday). Panel B describes the corporate characteristics of the FIEs, while Panel C reports the descriptive statistics for tax audit adjustments. The mean audit adjustment as a percentage of sales (ADJ/SALES) is 3.8 percent for the full sample and 5.0 percent for the noncompliant subsample. The sample firms' mean sales average RMB 91 million (approximately U.S. $11 million).
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS Descriptive Statistics
Further analysis of audit data on the types of tax audit adjustments (not tabled) reveals that the largest adjustment in the pre-holiday period is overstatement of cost of sales. During initial operations, the cost accounting process is not usually well established, which leads to more adjustments for cost of sales. Entertainment and depreciation expenses that exceed the legal limits are the largest adjustments in the exemption and reduction periods, respectively. Finally, over-provision for staff welfare is the largest adjustment in the post-holiday period. Since the guidelines for the staff welfare provision are rather complicated and subject to negotiation with local tax authorities, firms try to claim larger expenses when the tax rate is high, as in the post-holiday period.
Univariate Statistics
The following chart summarizes the noncompliance behavior of FIEs in different taxholiday positions (data based on Panel C of ) is before the first profit-making year, 0 otherwise; TAX-EXEMPTION ϭ 1 if an FIE is within tax-exemption period, 0 otherwise; TAX-REDUCTION ϭ 1 if an FIE is within tax-reduction period, 0 otherwise; POST-HOLIDAY ϭ 1 if an FIE is after tax holiday or does not have tax holiday, 0 otherwise; EXPORT ϭ 1 if an FIE is an export-oriented enterprise, 0 otherwise; TECHNOLOGY ϭ 1 if an FIE is a high-technology enterprise, 0 otherwise; MANUFACTURING ϭ 1 if an FIE is a manufacturing-oriented enterprise, 0 otherwise; JOINT-VENTURE ϭ 1 if an FIE is a joint venture, 0 otherwise; HONGKONG-TAIWAN ϭ 1 if an FIE is sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan (a proxy for high-inside-ownership concentration), 0 otherwise; ADJ / SALES ϭ tax audit adjustment deflated by sales revenue. b ''Noncompliant Firms'' denotes firms with positive tax audit adjustments. The percentage of noncompliant firms (the rate of noncompliance) in each tax-holiday position is 80.56 percent, 58.44 percent, 76.53 percent, and 76.89 percent for pre-holiday, tax-exemption, tax-reduction, and post-holiday position, respectively. c The total number of sample firms (583) is distributed across the two categories for each of the variables as shown, with the corresponding percentages equal to 100 percent.
The rate of noncompliance is highest in the pre-holiday period and lowest in the exemption period. As hypothesized, the mean audit adjustments as a percentage of sales revenue in the pre-and post-holiday periods are greater than those in the tax-reduction period, which in turn are greater than those in the tax-exemption period. Table 2 reports univariate statistical tests comparing mean audit adjustments over the four tax-holiday positions. The overall F-test rejects the equality of the means at the 0.05 level, consistent with the hypothesis that tax-holiday positions affect FIEs' noncompliance. The multiple comparison tests indicate that firms are least compliant in the pre-holiday position and most compliant in the tax-exemption position, consistent with our hypothesis. However, we find no significant difference between the tax-reduction and post-holiday positions.
Further analysis indicates that for the FIEs reporting (pre-audit) losses, tax audit adjustments are most likely to transform those losses into profits for firms in the pre-holiday period. The audit adjustment transforms losses into profits for 18 percent, 0 percent, 4 percent and 3 percent, of the (pre-audit) loss-making FIEs in pre-holiday, tax-exemption, tax-reduction and post-holiday positions, respectively. Furthermore, the tax audit adjustment transferred 10 percent of the firms (seven firms) in the pre-holiday period to the taxexemption period. The average noncompliance (i.e. audit adjustment/sales) for these seven firms was 23.8 percent, as opposed to an average of 7.8 percent for other firms in the preholiday period, and 3.8 percent for the overall sample. Thus, FIEs in the pre-holiday position often manipulate taxable income by exaggerating losses before their first profitmaking year, so as to extend their tax holiday. Table 3 shows the results of the multiple regression analysis. The overall regression model is significant at the 0.05 level.
Results of Regression Analysis
8 All of the tax-holiday variables are significantly positive at the 0.05 level, suggesting that the tax audit adjustment in the exemption period is significantly smaller than in other tax-holiday periods. A Wald coefficient test (EViews 3 User's Guide 1998) indicates that the coefficient for PRE-HOLIDAY (4.545) is significantly higher than the coefficients for TAX-REDUCTION (2.611) and POST-HOLIDAY (2.623) at the 0.05 level, but the latter two coefficients are not significantly different from each other. Consistent with the univariate analysis, these regression results on the whole support our hypothesis. Specifically, tax audit adjustments in the pre-holiday period are significantly greater than are those in other holiday periods. Tax audit adjustments in the post-holiday and tax-reduction periods are also significantly greater than those in the taxexemption period. However, contrary to our expectation, audit adjustments in the postholiday period are not significantly greater than those in the tax-reduction period.
Our univariate and multiple regression evidence on noncompliance in tax-exemption, tax-reduction, and post-holiday periods, is generally consistent with prior research concluding that higher tax rates lead to less compliance. However, we find that noncompliance is highest in the pre-holiday period even though the tax rate is technically zero. In this circumstance, firms not only consider the current period's tax position, but also their evasion strategy considers the total tax burden over multiple future periods. Table 3 also shows that EXPORT, MANUFACTURING, and JOINT-VENTURE play significant incremental roles in explaining the magnitude of the tax audit adjustments. As One-way analysis of variance on the differences among four means (T1, T2, T3, T4): F statistic ϭ 9.379 (p ϭ 0.00) a We used the Least Significant Difference test (Norusis 1996) for the pairwise comparison. We also conducted a pairwise comparison based on the Bonferroni test, which controls for overall error rate (Norusis 1996) . The result is identical to the Least Significant Difference test except that T1 Ϫ T4 is not significant. b Log(ADJ / SALES) ϭ natural logarithm of tax audit adjustment deflated by sales revenue.
expected, export-oriented FIEs have a smaller detected noncompliance than their domestic market-oriented counterparts (p Ͻ 0.05). Industry affiliation and form of investment are marginally significant at the 0.10 level. As expected, manufacturing-oriented FIEs have smaller audit adjustments, and we also find that joint ventures are, on average, less compliant than wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
We conducted additional tests to check the robustness of the regression results. First, we conducted a TOBIT analysis (EViews 3 User's Guide 1998). Second, we reran the regression with all zero audit adjustments excluded. Third, we reran the regression without the logarithmic transformation, using White's procedure (Gujarati 1999) to correct for heteroskedasticity. Fourth, we reran the regression with an additional control variable to account for the profit or loss status of the firm. Fifth, we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA). The significance of the tax-holiday variables remains the same in all of the robustness tests, whereas the marginally significant MANUFACTURING and JOINT-VENTURE control variables are not significant in two of the five tests. Finally, we reran the regression with the ''post-holiday export-oriented'' FIEs reclassified into the taxreduction period (see footnote 7). All the tax-holiday variables remain significant, but the EXPORT variable is no longer significant.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Developing countries rely on foreign investment to help develop their economies.
9
Many use tax holidays as an incentive to attract foreign investment. This study provides empirical evidence that a firm's tax-holiday position affects its noncompliance. Firms are least compliant during the pre-holiday period and most compliant during the tax-exemption period. Therefore, public policymakers may want to consider redesigning tax holidays to Log(ADJ / SALES) ϭ natural logarithm of tax audit adjustment deflated by sales revenue; PRE-HOLIDAY ϭ 1 if an FIE (Foreign Investment Enterprise) is before the first profit-making year, 0 otherwise; TAX-REDUCTION ϭ 1 if an FIE is within tax-reduction period, 0 otherwise; POST-HOLIDAY ϭ 1 if an FIE is after tax holiday or does not have tax holiday, 0 otherwise; EXPORT ϭ 1 if an FIE is an export-oriented enterprise, 0 otherwise; TECHNOLOGY ϭ 1 if an FIE is a high-technology enterprise, 0 otherwise; MANUFACTURING ϭ 1 if an FIE is a manufacturing-oriented enterprise, 0 otherwise; JOINT-VENTURE ϭ 1 if an FIE is a joint venture, 0 otherwise; HONGKONG-TAIWAN ϭ 1 if an FIE is sourced from Hong Kong or Taiwan (a proxy for high-inside-ownership concentration), 0 otherwise. reduce noncompliance, for example, by limiting the length of the pre-holiday period. In addition, tax authorities should consider intensifying audit scrutiny during periods of higher noncompliance, such as in the pre-and post-holiday periods. Our evidence that noncompliance is highest in the pre-holiday period when the tax rate is technically zero, suggests that firms in this circumstance do not only consider the current period's tax rate in their evasion strategy. They have a longer horizon over which they want to minimize taxes. We also find that domestic market-oriented firms, service-oriented firms, and joint ventures, respectively, are less compliant than export-oriented firms, manufacturing-oriented firms, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Such evidence should help policymakers understand factors associated with tax noncompliance, and help tax authorities target firms for audit.
APPENDIX General Guidelines on Annual Tax Audits in China
Annual tax audits involve the following procedures:
(1) Audit Planning Before conducting the field work, tax officials obtain a general understanding of the entity's background, including its operations and tax status. They then perform a financialstatement analysis to identify areas that might have misstatements affecting the entity's tax liability. Tax authorities notify an enterprise three days before the audit about the time schedule, location, and documents required for examination.
(2) Field Work
Tax officials should be familiar with the Income Tax Laws of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (NPC 1991) , the related implementation regulations, tax treaties, and other tax-concession policies affecting the enterprises audited. In addition, they should examine the tax returns filed, financial statements, and other tax-related documents to ensure proper tax filing. They should follow the detailed procedures provided in the regulation for investigating individual items in financial statements (SAT 1993a) . For example, the regulation requires auditors to investigate sales, purchase of materials, fixed assets and depreciation, wages, welfare expenses, land-use rights, entertainment expenses, production costs, accounts receivable and provision for bad debts, and other income. The time spent on each audit depends on the firm's size, the complexity of its operations and the integrity of the company records.
(3) Appeal
When a taxpayer disagrees with the audit adjustments and penalties, the taxpayer must first pay the tax demanded, and then apply for a tax administration review within 60 days (SAT 1993b, Article 31) . Taxpayers apply to the tax authorities at the next higher level for reconsideration. For example, tax authorities at provincial level review disagreements at city level. The Tax Administration Review Committee of the higher tax authority should decide on each appeal within 60 days. If the taxpayer objects to the decision, the taxpayer can institute legal proceedings in the People's Court. In practice, few FIEs have requested formal reviews (Huang and Yu 1997) .
